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Abstract 
The privacy and the security regulations are two essential requirements of Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA), recognized by US congress in 1996 as the US Federal Law followed by global e-health industry, in the 
protection of healthcare privacy. In this paper, a certificate authority (CA) based duality solution has been proposed to 
fulfill the HIPAA privacy and security regulations that supports both contract and smart card based systems. It presents a 
patient-centric e-health system based on RSA based public key certificate that allows secure sharing of healthcare 
information through internet. Doctors and relevant medical staff  access to 
patients data stored in the national medical center server (MCS). A copy of PHI text-data is stored in patients -health 
smart card to support the duality. A random session key is generated in each appointment after prior authentication to 
upload and retrieve PHI data to or from MCS. One advantage is that the proposed CA based e-health system is 
easy implementable using existing security standards, tools and products. Discussions regarding the fulfillment of HIPAA 
regulations and comparison with the existing schemes have been provided to show the better performance of our scheme. 
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1. Introduction 
The implementation of e-health systems and services in all countries with privacy and security is a 
challenging job which is shared by several health agencies and health authorities at the international, national 
and local levels. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [HIPAA, 1996] are 
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recognized by the United States Congress in 1996 as the US Federal Law that applies to the U.S. healthcare 
industry and may also be applied to other countries with their relevant domestic laws. HIPAA standard 
[HIPAA, 1996] has not defined how the privacy and security regulations can be accomplished. According to 
the 
entire health industry throughout the world [Yanga et al., 2006; Collmann et al., 2004].  
     The privacy and security regulations of HIPAA [HIPAA, 1996] are strongly related and complemented each 
security of health information, a brief 
discussion of them are given below [Lee and Lee, 2008; Hu et al., 2010]. The privacy and security regulations 
are defined as follows. 
 Patients : Patients data will be used and kept, which 
  
 Confidentiality: Various software safeguards such as encryption, authentication etc. are described by 
security regulations to protect health-data during storage and transmissions. 
 Patients : Patients can control the access to their PHI by managing cryptographic keys. 
 Data integrity: Patients PHI data should be protected from medical omissions, tampering and unauthorized 
destruction. 
 Consent exception: In life-saving purposes and other exceptional situations, the access of the PHI without 
 
To accomplish the above requirements, three cryptographic mechanisms have been proposed so far and they 
are explained below in brief [Lee and Lee, 2008; Hu et al., 2010; Huang and Liu, 2011].  
In 2008, Lee and Lee [Lee and Lee, 2008] proposed a smart card based cryptographic key management 
scheme for HIPAA privacy and security regulations. Several limitations of this scheme have been found and 
observed as the scheme is session based and requires the presence of the smart card for each access to the PHI 
which is unrealistic, and patients cannot freely change their own passwords of smartcards. The major problems 
of this scheme, like other smart card based systems, are that it cannot authenticate the presenter of the smart 
card and the multiple accesses to the PHI by different people from different locations are not supported during 
the whole medical treatment process. This scheme also not supports the recent paper based e-health system 
environment, where the patients' PHI data is entirely left to the medical service provider such as a hospital that 
grants the every access to it after secure authorization, and each patient signs a fixed time-period contract with 
the hospital to allow the access of his PHI data.  
To establish the contract-oriented system, J. Hu et al. [Hu et al., 2010] proposed a hybrid public key 
infrastructure solution (HPKI) for HIPAA privacy and security regulations in 2010. In this scheme, a smartcard 
trust centre (STC) issues medicare smart cards to each patient and patients data is entirely left to the 
medical centre server (MCS) during the contract period. Some limitations of this scheme have been observed 
such as this scheme is out of patients since relevant medical service providers have unlimited access to 
the PHI in patients  absence. Also no clear procedure is given for consent exception cases and treatment in 
foreign countries.  
In 2011, Huang and Liu [Huang and Liu, 2011] proposed a new smart card based key management scheme 
for HIPAA privacy and security regulations in elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC). In this scheme, instead of 
RSA, ECC has been used to minimize the key size and computation cost for registration, signature verification 
and encryption-decryption processes. It generally follows Lee  that all the limitations of 
the same exist except allowing patients to freely choose and update their passwords.  
This paper presents a new patient-centric e-health architecture for supporting both the contract oriented and 
smart card based systems. In brief, a national medical centre server (MCS) is considered to store all relevant 
data including a , which is not accessible without the patient s permission. After 
authentication with the MCS, each patient, doctors and relevant medical staff register for treatment, access 
and/or upload patients data etc to the MCS using a temporary secret session key and after completion of 
treatment, the complete PHI data is uploaded to MCS, where a copy of the PHI text-data is stored in patients  e-
health smart card. For authentication of different entities, the proposed scheme uses the RSA based public-key 
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certificate issued by certificate authority (CA) [Weise, 2001; NIST, 2001; Elgamal, 1985; Stalings, 2009] and a 
symmetric encryption-decryption for PHI data transmission. The proposed technique can also support the 
the treatment in foreign countries. One of the advantages is that the 
proposed e-health system is implementable using existing cryptographic security standards, tools and products. 
A discussion also added here regarding the fulfilment of the HIPAA security/ regulations followed by a 
comparison with the existing schemes proposed so far. 
The remaining parts of this paper are organized as follows. In section 2, the CA based e-health system is 
proposed to fulfil the HIPAA privacy and security regulations. Discussions regarding how the proposed scheme 
fulfils the HIPAA regulations and a comparative study with existing schemes are given in section 3. Finally, 
section 4 concludes the importance of the proposed scheme. 
2. Proposed RSA-CA based e-health system 
In our proposed e-health system, each patient, doctor and relevant medical staff have their own public key 
certificate. Each patient has to register at the national medical center server (MCS) to get e-health service 
provided by the national medical service provider. The MCS has its own database and stores all relevant data 
get access to the MCS through internet . Foreign 
medical service providers 
 The details of the proposed scheme 
are addressed below, where the following notations are used: 
 
h (_) : A one-way hash function (e.g. SHA1);                      (PRP, PUP) : Private/public key pair of patient; 
(PRDOC, PUDOC) : Private/public key pair of doctor;            (PRMCS, PUMCS) : Private/public key pair of MCS;  
CAMCS : Public key certificate of MCS;           IDP  : Identity of patient;                 IDDOC  : Identity of Doctor;                
CAP : Public key certificate of patient;           RDOC : Nonce of doctor;                    RP : Nonce of patient;                         
CADOC : Public key certificate of doctor;        KS: Secret session key;                     RMCS : Nonce of MCS;   
REGK  : Registration key of patient;              E : Encryption;                                  D : Decryption;  
2.1. The proposed scheme 
The proposed scheme is divided into five phases, namely registration, PHI data generation and upload, PHI 
data retrieval in general and emergency situation and foreign treatment, which are now addressed below. 
2.2.1 Registration Phase 
A patient has to provide his certificate and his identity to register with the MCS. After receiving these, MCS 
ontract w, which is public and consists of the signed 
consent, the data received from the patient etc. The MCS then KREG = 
h(w||k) where, q is a random number, as shown in Fig 1.  
Step 1:  Patient  MCS: IDP, reg. req, CAP, RP  
A patient sends his registration request with his public key certificate, identity and a nonce RP to the 
MCS. On receiving, MCS validates and retrieves the public key with timestamp.  
Step 2:  MCS  Patient: 
PPU
E  (RMCS, RP), CAMCS 
In response, MCS encrypts his challenge RMCS to authenticate the patient together with RP using the 
, and sends the same and its own public key certificate to the patient.  
957 Sangram Ray and G. P. Biswas /  Procedia Technology  6 ( 2012 )  954 – 961 
 
 
Fig. 1. registration phase 
Step 3: Patient  MCS:  
MCSPU
E (RP, RMCS) 
After receiving, patient validates the MCS , retrieves its public key, decrypts the encrypted 
message using his private key and gets back his own challenge challenge RMCS. 
Now the patient sends a reply message by encrypting to complete the 
mutual authentication, where the order of RP and RMCS is switched to prevent the replay attack.    
Step 4: MCS  Patient: w,  
MCSPR
E  (h(w)),  
PPU
E  (KREG) 
MCS receives the reply message, decrypts it using its private key and gets back its own nonce sent that 
confirms the patient authenticity. The MCS then creates the  contract w consisting of the 
signed consent, the data received from the patient etc, and generates the registration key KREG = 
h(w||k) where, q is a random number. Since w is public, MCS sends it directly to the patient 
together with the signed hash value of w for integrity and as a proof of the legality of the contract. The 
registration key is stored at MCS and a copy is sent to 
public key to ensure that only patient will get it. 
2.2.2 PHI data generation and upload procedure 
The PHI data generation and upload procedure is sequentially divided into two phases, namely temporary 
secret session key generation and PHI data generation and upload. 
2.2.2.1 Temporary secret session key generation 
For each appointment of a patient with any doctor trusted by the MCS, doctor/MCS generates a random 
secret session key KS and negotiates it for that particular period. The KS is temporary and is deleted at the end 
of each appointment. For a new appointment with any doctor, a new temporary KS is generated. 
2.2.2.2 PHI data generation and upload 
When a patient meets any doctor for treatment purposes, the doctor generates a temporary secret session key 
KS  data. The PHI data are categorized namely text-data and 
image-data. The PHI text-data consists of sensitive textual data of less size including the name, 
address, medical test results etc, and image-data consists of large volume of medical images. After generating 
upload request to the MCS and uploads the 
signed and encrypted data as shown in Fig 2 and illustrated as follows:  
Step 1:  Doctor  MCS: IDDOC, upload req, IDP, CADOC, RDOC  
A d upload request with his identity, certificate, the  
and a nonce RDOC to MCS. After receiving, MCS validates the doctor and retrieves the 
docto  
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Fig. 2. PHI data uploading protocol 
Step 2:  MCS  Doctor: 
DOCPU
E  (RMCS, RDOC), CAMCS 
In response, MCS generates a challenge RMCS, encrypts it with RDOC using doctor  and 
sends it with its certificate to the doctor.  
Step 3:  Doctor  MCS: 
MCSPU
E  (RDOC, RMCS) 
After receiving, the doctor validates the MCS , retrieves its public key, decrypts the 
encrypted message using his private key and gets back his own challenge, which confirms that MCS is 
authenticated. Now to be authenticated to MCS, the doctor sends a reply message encrypted using 
RDOC and RMCS is switched to prevent a replay attack.  
Step 4:  Doctor  MCS: 
MCSPU
E  (KS),  
DOCPR
E  (h(PHI)), 
SK
E  (IDDOC|| IDP||PHI) 
MCS gets the reply message, decrypts using its private key and gets back the same nonce which 
confirms the mutual authentication. Now the doctor generates a temporary secret session key KS and 
 for negotiation. The doctor also concatenates the 
, encrypts the concatenated message 
using KS and sends the same and signed hash digest of PHI to the MCS as message 4.  
Step 5:  MCS  Patient: 
REGK
E  (PHI text-data),  
MCSPR
E  (h(PHI text-data)) 
After receiving, MCS uses the session key KS obtained by decrypting with his private key, to decrypt 
the encrypted message, gets the PHI, and identity of the patient and the doctor. Now MCS 
compares the identities of patient and doctor, if both are same, then the MCS calculates the hash digest 
of the PHI data and compares it with the signed hashed PHI data sent by the doctor. If it passes, MCS 
stores the PHI temporary key KS. 
After uploading, MCS sends a copy of PHI text-data to the corresponding patient. For this, MCS 
encrypts the uploaded PHI text-data using , puts a signature on PHI text-data, 
and sends the encrypted message with the signed value to the patient. Now the patient decrypts the 
message using KREG, gets the PHI text-data, calculates the hash digest, and compares it with the 
received signed hashed PHI text-data. If  passes, the patient stores the PHI text-data in his smart card.  
2.2.3 PHI data retrieval procedure 
During any treatment period, the doctor may require the previous PHI data stored at MCS. To do this, the 
doctor sends a PHI data retrieve request to MCS and follows the internal authentication procedure. After 
receiving the PHI data retrieve request, the MCS generates a new temporary secret session key KS with the 
from MCS through PHI data retrieval protocol is shown in Fig 3 and illustrated as follows:  
Step 1 to step 3 are same as the PHI data uploading protocol discussed in Sec. 2.2.2.2 except that instead of 
959 Sangram Ray and G. P. Biswas /  Procedia Technology  6 ( 2012 )  954 – 961 
uploading request, the doctor sends the PHI data retrieve request to MCS at step 1.  
 
 
Fig. 3. PHI data retrieval protocol 
Step 4:  MCS  Doctor:  
DOCPU
E  (KS),  
SK
E  (  
REGK
E  (PHI)||w|| IDP) 
MCS receives the message 3, decrypts it using its private key and gets back the same nonce which 
confirms that the mutual authentication is completed. Now the MCS generates a temporary secret 
session key KS and sends it to the doctor encrypted using the It also encrypts the 
data , concatenates it with w , 
encrypts the concatenated message using KS, and then sends the same to the doctor as message 4. 
After receiving the message 4, the doctor decrypts the encrypted KS using his private key and gets 
KS. Now he decrypts the encrypted message using KS and gets the encrypted PHI. Since the 
PHI data so the doctor canno
absence. PHI data is not accessible with . 
To make accessible it, the patient decrypts the encrypted PHI data by using his registration key 
secretly. The patient can also provide his PHI text-data directly to the doctor using his smart card.  
 
During this treatment period, if the doctor wants to upload the 
signed and encrypted PHI data to MCS using the same KS of that appointment through PHI data uploading 
protocol as shown in Fig 2. At the end of the appointment, the MCS deletes the KS as previously discussed. 
2.2.4 PHI data retrieval in emergency period 
an emergency PHI data retrieve request 
with the the MCS.  The procedure to retrieve the patien the MCS in 
condition is shown in Fig 4 and illustrated as follows:  
 
Fig.4. PHI data retrieval in emergency period 
After receiving the emergency PHI data retrieve request from a doctor, the MCS initially authenticates the 
doctor followed by step 1 to step 3 of PHI data uploading protocol discussed in Sec. 2.2.2.2.  
Step 4:   
DOCPU
E  (KS),  SKE  (PHI||w||IDP) 
After completion of mutual authentication, MCS generates a temporary secret session key KS and 
The MCS also  
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data, the contract w and the KS, and sends it to the doctor. The doctor decrypts 
using his private key and gets the KS and then decrypts the message using KS to get PHI data.  
During the emergency period the doctor cannot upload the 
sense. When patient is in sense, the doctor uploads the signed and encrypted data to MCS through PHI data 
uploading protocol as shown in Fig 2 using the same KS of that appointment.  
 
In foreign countries, a patient has to provide his public-key certificate, his identity and his nationality to the 
foreign MCS. After receiving these, the foreign MCS completes the mutual authentication procedure and 
 consists of the signed consent, the data received from the patient etc. Now the 
KREG  where, q is a random number and 
follows the PHI data upload and retrieval protocol as shown in Fig 2 and Fig 3. During this treatment process 
the t the end of the 
 
3. Fulfillment  of HIPAA regulations and comparison with other schemes 
In this section, the fulfillment of the HIPPA privacy-security regulations in our proposed e-health scheme 
and its comparison with the existing three schemes are given in following two sub-sections. 
3.1 Fulfillment of HIPAA regulations  
 In order to describe the fulfillment of HIPAA privacy and security regulations, the summarized regulations 
[Lee and Lee, 2008; Hu et al., 2010; Huang and Liu, 2011] and their corresponding implementations are 
explained below:  
 Pa : In our scheme, a signed permission either in paper or electronically is required 
from patients to register at the MCS. This sets up the terms and regulations regarding how their PHI data 
will be accessed and stored in MCS according to the security protocols illustrated above. It also explains 
how his PHI data can be retrieved in his emergency situation.  
 Confidentiality: The randomly generation of temporary secret session key KS ensures that the session key is 
securely generated by th  and negotiated with MCS by 
. To upload or retrieve, the PHI data is encrypted using KS to obtain 
confidentiality. The CA based authentication protocols discussed above provide cryptographic security 
 So it is reasonable to assure that the confidentiality of the 
obtained in our scheme. 
 : In our scheme, the permission to upload and retrieve the patient is controlled 
by the MCS and the patient. To decrypt the encrypted PHI, the corresponding temporary secret session key 
KS  must be obtained. Although KS is not sufficient to 
retrieve the PHI data since it is also the 
 must be needed .   
 Data integrity: In our proposed scheme, the PHI data is encrypted using KS and the 
key, so no one can alter it.  Also, in each uploading and retrieval phase, a signed hash digest of PHI data is 
also sent to ensure the data integrity and data redundancy. KS 
cryptographically ensures the non-repudiation.  
 Consent exception: The proposed scheme provides the security control in life-saving emergency cases, 
 data in emergency situation. 
Thus our proposed e-health system fulfils the privacy and security regulations of HIPAA. 
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3.2 Comparison 
So far, only three e-health systems have been proposed in the literature [Lee and Lee, 2008; Hu et al., 2010; 
Huang and Liu, 2011], and their introduction, analysis and shortcomings are already given earlier, and as a 
remedy, a contract based scheme based on the RSA algorithm and public key certificate is proposed in this 
paper. Since the MCS is connected and accessible through internet, any medical staff can use MCS online for 
accessing and/or uploading the patients different geographical location. However, no one 
can access the patients s also a patient does not need to carry the 
PHI for his treatment although a copy of the same is stored in a  as a support for the duality 
of the PHI data. Now, a comparison table is provided, where a feature-based comparison of the proposed 
scheme with other existing schemes is reported that shows overall better performance than others. 
 
Table 1. Comparison of proposed scheme with existing schemes 
 
Parameters Lee and Lee, 2008 Hu et al., 2010 Huang and Liu, 2011 Proposed Scheme 
Avoidance of Replay Attack  No       No    No            Yes 
   Yes        No      Yes            Yes 
during foreign treatment  No  No                      No    Yes 
Clear specification to retrieve PHI data in Emergency  No  No                      No    Yes 
Duality (smartcard and/or MCS)  No  No                      No    Yes 
4. Conclusion 
A contract oriented and RSA-CA based solution for supporting HIPAA privacy and security regulations for 
online e-health systems is proposed in this paper, where a duality solution for PHI data is organized. The online 
access of the patients -repudiation 
etc. The procedures are also given to ha emergency situation and to support the treatment in 
foreign countries. A comparative study is made that shows the importance and easy implementation of our 
proposed scheme using available tools/software.  
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